The indication of ethnicity in a Soviet internal passport was a curse for the Jews but a blessing for statisticians.
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Demographic study of the Jews in the former Soviet Union (FSU), based on a wealth of statistical data, has a long and well-established tradition. This essay first presents an overview of tsarist and Soviet demographic data regarding Jews. Because most of the Soviet data were kept hidden until the end of the Soviet period, the focus here is on findings of the last quarter century. Particular attention will then be given to the role of the Soviet internal passport (which, because it listed ethnicity, was the basis for Jewish statistics) and to the consequences of the elimination of compulsory ethnic identification in the post-Soviet Slavic countries.
Tsarist and Soviet Demographic Data
Vital statistics data were routinely collected and processed for European Russia starting in 1867, with Jews considered one of the empire's religious groups. In the first census of the tsarist empire in 1897, Jews were categorized on the basis of religion and/or language for the country as a whole and for each of its regions. At the beginning of the 20th century, data on Jewish marriages, births, and deaths over a 40-year period were complied and analyzed by Sergei Novoselsky and Veniamin Binshtok. 2 Another early 20th-century study, dealing with Jews recorded in the 1897 census, was carried out by Boris Brutskus. 3 In the 1970s, Bronislaw Bloch approached the data with much more sophisticated demographic techniques and established baselines (that is, total fertility rate and life expectancy) for the study of subsequent developments. 4 Several years later, Shaul Stampfer analyzed marriage patterns of Jews in the tsarist empire. 5 During the years of revolution and civil war, statistical data collection was suspended in most parts of the country. In the 1920s, there was a resumption of coverage of Jewish vital events and the size and structure of the Jewish population. Whereas
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Four censuses were undertaken in the Soviet Union in the postwar period: in 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989 . In all of these censuses, ethnicity was recorded and data on Jews were collected, including statistics relating to geographical distribution, agesex composition, and marital structure. Most of these data were not published before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Even the total number of Jews in many large Soviet cities in the postwar period was not publicly known until Mark Kupovetsky presented findings based on previously inaccessible archival sources. 19 For most of the former Soviet republics, material relating to age composition of the Jewish population has been published only for large age groups. 20 Details regarding age-sex composition have been published for the Jewish populations of the three Slavic republics (from all postwar Soviet censuses), for Uzbekistan (from the 1959 and 1989 Soviet censuses), and for Dagestan (from the 1989 Soviet census). 21 To this should be added existing data on the number of children ever born to Jewish women from the 1979 and 1989 Soviet censuses, and information on the family structure of the Jewish population that was detailed in the results of the same censuses. Based on the special processing of the 1979 Soviet census data for different ethnicities, the incidence of mixed marriage among Jews and ethnic affiliation of children of mixed couples was also measured. 22 In sum, Soviet censuses and vital statistics have resulted in a long and detailed series of data on ethnicity. Some of the previously suppressed data for the Jewish population were published in the post-Soviet period. Much other information remains to be studied. There is, however, a strong basis for future research on the Jewish population of the FSU.
The Soviet Internal Passport and Counting of Jews
Soviet internal passports that indicated ethnicity (natsionalnost) were introduced in 1932-though in fact such passports had long been part of the tsarist regime's tradition of population surveillance. 23 Under the tsarist regime, Jews had been categorized by religion rather than ethnicity and were subject as a group to official discrimination and persecution. In contrast, the early Soviet regime targeted segments of the population on the basis of social (class) status and origin. Thus, Jews as such did not fear unfavorable consequences when their ethnic origins were made known to the Soviet authorities.
Overall, the Jewish population constituted one of the most loyal components of the new Soviet society. Many Jews benefited from opportunities for rapid upward social mobility, in particular those who moved to cities and joined the Soviet elite. 24 Many others remained in the shtetlach of the former tsarist Pale of Settlement. Having endured pogroms both before and during the civil war, they feared anarchy and accepted the Soviet regime as the lesser evil among the various possibilities. 25 In consequence, the great majority of Soviet Jews voluntarily chose to be registered as Jews in their passports.
By the end of the 1930s, this ethnic identification had become permanent and could not be officially changed. 26 The ethnicity of every Soviet citizen aged 16 and above was written in his or her internal passport, and anyone with two Jewish parents had no choice but to be registered as Jewish. Soviet authorities, contrary to their proclaimed goal of assimilation, actually preserved Soviet Jewry by the compulsory labeling of individuals as Jews. 27 Only the offspring of mixed marriages had the option to choose the ethnicity of one or the other parent: most of them preferred to be listed under the ethnic label of the non-Jewish parent. 28 The listing of ethnicity in Soviet internal passports formed a good basis for ethnic statistics. 29 Soviet vital statistics listed the ethnicity of the parents of a newborn child or that of a deceased adult on the basis of what was recorded in the internal passports.
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For deceased children under the age of 16 (who did not have such passports), ethnicity was established on the basis of the parents' ethnicity. In the case of the death of a child whose parents belonged to different ethnicities, the child was recorded as having the ethnicity stated by the person who reported the death. Only if the deceased child was less than one year old was he or she automatically recorded as being of the mother's ethnicity.
Significantly, data from the Soviet censuses were based entirely on the selfdeclaration of respondents. There was no requirement to provide documentary evidence for any answer given, and with regard to ethnicity, census takers were given explicit instructions that ethnic identity was to be determined solely by the person polled-without any corroboration. 31 For children, ethnicity in censuses was determined by parents. In the first three postwar censuses (1959, 1970, and 1979 ), whenever there was difficulty in determining the ethnicity of a child whose parents belonged to different ethnicities, preference was to be given to that of the mother. In the last Soviet census (in 1989), some of the recommendations in this regard were removed from the instructions to the census takers.
Some scholars have claimed that a sizable number of Jews in the Soviet censuses were recorded under another ethnicity. Benjamin Pinkus, for instance, argued that 11 percent of Jews polled in the 1926 Soviet census, 8 to 10 percent in the 1939 Soviet census, and as many as 15 percent in the 1959 Soviet census were counted as members of another ethnic group. 32 Most scholars today, however, are in agreement that the Soviet census figures on Jewish ethnicity (adults only) are in fact very much in accord with the "legal" ethnicity recorded in internal Soviet passports. 33 Uziel O. Schmelz was the first who properly studied the published data of the 1959 and 1970 Soviet censuses for Jews; based on their results (that is, in the absence of published birth and death data), he recognized that there was a negative balance of births and deaths among the Jewish population. 34 In this manner, the question regarding trends of demographic development for the Soviet core Jewish population was answered. As noted, data from the Soviet censuses was based entirely on the self-declaration of respondents, and therefore they are regarded as "a good example of a large and empirically measured core Jewish population in the Diaspora." 35 According to the 1989 census, in all age groups under the age of 55 in the Soviet Union, there were more males than females among Jews. This finding was questioned by some scholars. For instance, Yoel Florsheim and Dorith Tal attempted to correct age-sex ratios for the Jewish population of the Soviet Union based on the respective ratios recorded for Soviet immigrants to Israel from 1989 to 1994. 36 However, their calculations ignored the fact that (as will later be discussed in more detail) many of the immigrants had not been listed in their internal passports as Jews, and were thus not listed as Jewish in the 1989 Soviet census. Moreover, this migration was highly selective. For all destinations, the emigration rates among Jews from the Russian Federation were generally higher for females than for males. 37 Therefore, using agesex ratios of the immigrants is not a reasonable approach. It is important to note that, at my request, Evgeny Andreev computed a stable population model 38 that took into account mortality rates among the Jews in the Soviet Union in [1988] [1989] . According to this model, the male-female ratio for Jews in all groups up to (and including) that of individuals aged 50-54 was similar to that reported in the 1989 Soviet census.
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To be sure, some of the results of the Soviet censuses with regard to Jews were unintentionally distorted in the course of the concealment of certain groups-for instance, prisoners and military personnel-in the general results. The most striking example of unintentional distortion is the biased geographical distribution of some parts of the Jewish population in the official results of the 1939 Soviet census. Data in this census were falsified to some extent in order to mask the great population losses caused by the forced collectivization and famine of 1932-1933. The procedures used to falsify data were rather complicated, and resulted in a certain amount of distorted data with regard to all ethnic groups, among them the Jews.
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For instance, according to the 1939 census for the Kazakh SSR, an unusually high percentage of Jews-47.5 percent-lived in rural areas. In some provinces of Kazakhstan the reported percentage was even higher: 83.0 percent in Kustanai, 82.8 percent in Akmolin, 76.0 percent in Pavlodar. Moreover, these proportions correlate with an unusually high percentage of males among the Jewish population. These deviations were caused in the main by the redistribution of many census forms of gulag prisoners (held in the Russian Federation) to Kazakhstan, the most famineravaged republic, in order to conceal the concentration of huge numbers of prisoners in the northern and eastern parts of Russia. According to my calculations, some 5,600 Jewish prisoners were "reassigned" to the Kazakh SSR; in consequence, the Jewish population of Kazakhstan was inflated by more than 40 percent for this reason alone. Moreover, in the 1939 Soviet census in Kazakhstan, the general inflation ratio seems to be as high as about 3.0 for rural Jews (that is, showing three times as many Jews as were actually present) and more than 1.5 for total Jews. 41 According to analogous calculations, it appears that the official results of the 1939 census reassigned 5,800 Jews imprisoned in the Russian Federation to Ukraine, the second most terribly famine-ravaged republic. However, given the large Jewish population of Ukraine (according to the official data, more than one and a half million), the same phenomenon had a much smaller impact on the total reported number of Jews in this republic.
From the above, we may conclude that the significant distortions estimated for the official 1939 census results of the Jews in Kazakhstan were the exception rather than the rule even in this census. In all, redistribution of prisoners' census forms from the northern and eastern parts of the Russian Federation did not seriously change the geographic distribution of the Jewish population as a whole. 42 Moreover, one should stress that both these parts of the Soviet Union-Kazakhstan and those places of the Russian Federation from which the filled-in census forms were taken-were not occupied by the Nazis during the Second World War; in the case of Ukraine, which was occupied, the inflation ratio is rather small. Consequently, these census falsifications are of marginal importance in terms of estimates of Jewish losses during the Second World War.
Similarly, there is a certain distortion of data in all postwar Soviet censuses, resulting from the fact that the census forms of many conscripts were not sent back to the regions from which they were drafted. 43 Since military draftees are almost exclusively males in a very narrow age range, the consequence can be a serious distortion of general census results, especially in the case of small ethnic groups. For example, according to the data of the 1989 census, the age-sex ratios for the Central Asian (Bukharan) Jews in Uzbekistan were most unusual. At age 18 there were only 55 males per 100 females, and at the age of 19 this ratio was as low as 39. Conversely, for the pre-draft age of 17, the ratio was 111 males per 100 females.
Even after Schmelz's analysis of the decline in core Jewish population was published, there continued to be a widespread perception that the total number of people of Jewish parentage (and their spouses) was on the increase. How was this broader category of the Soviet Jewish population to be measured? The solution was to employ an additional definition of Jewish population based on household data from Soviet censuses. This approach empirically measured the enlarged Jewish population, which includes core Jews as well as all their household members. 44 Based on the 1989 census results, the enlarged Jewish population was estimated for the Soviet Union as a whole and for its three Slavic republics. 45 These estimates showed that the spread of mixed marriage, concurrent with a low level of Jewish ethnic affiliation of the children of such marriages, brought about a situation whereby the enlarged Jewish population in the Soviet Union on the eve of its dissolution was much larger than the core Jewish population: in the late 1980s, the ratio of core to enlarged Jewish population was roughly 1 to 1.5.
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At the same time, estimates showed that this category of Jewish population was itself shrinking. For example, in the Russian Federation, the estimated size of the enlarged Jewish population decreased from about 1,100,000 in 1979 to 910,000 in 1989, despite an increase in the ratio of core to enlarged Jewish population from 1.5 in 1979 to 1.6 in 1989. This corresponds with the negative balance of total number of children born to Jewish parents and Jewish deaths beginning in the 1960s. By the end of the 1980s, the Jewish demographic balance was decidedly unfavorable in all the republics of the European part of the Soviet Union. 47 Thus, the demographic collapse of Soviet Jewry was discovered with the help of different indicators, all of which show that the trend began before the start of the great emigration of the 1990s.
Changes in Vital and Migration Statistics in the Post-Soviet Era
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, demographic statistics of the 15 newly independent states started to diverge. However, the old Soviet system of collecting and processing demographic information by ethnicity continued to operate in most of these countries. As a result, for 1993, it was possible to obtain and publish the number of births to Jewish mothers and the number of Jewish deaths for 13 of the post-Soviet countries (all except Georgia and Lithuania). 48 Moreover, Jewish mortality in Moscow in 1993-1995 was detailed and compared with that of the other ethnic groups. 49 A microcensus conducted in 1994 in the Russian Federation has become an additional important source of post-Soviet Jewish demographic research. 50 This survey, encompassing a 5 percent representative sample of the total population, provided a new basis for estimating the core Jewish population along with its geographical distribution and structure. 51 Based on the data of this microcensus, geographical distribution and age-sex structure of the enlarged Jewish population were also estimated. The enlarged population was estimated for the country as a whole, as well as separately for the Jews in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the provinces outside these two cities. 52 These estimates did not cover some non-Ashkenazi Jews, mostly Mountain Jews (with their non-Jewish household members). To include them, I accordingly adjusted the total number of the enlarged Jewish population in the Russian Federation.
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In the mid-1990s, authorities of the three post-Soviet Slavic countries made a decision to cancel the listing of ethnicity in their internal passports. In general, Jews and other ethnic groups (for instance, Germans) who had suffered from discrimination in the Soviet Union were pleased with this reform. 54 However, for the demographic study of the Jews in these countries, the consequences of such a change were disastrous. Over the next decade, vital and migration statistics by ethnicity ceased to exist for the great majority of FSU Jews.
In the Russian Federation, 1998 was the last year in which comprehensive information regarding births and deaths by ethnicity was collected. In 1999, a new form of birth certificate was introduced, for which ethnicity became an optional listing "to be filled out according to the wishes (po zhelaniiu) of the person making the statement." 55 The following year, the registered number of births to Jewish mothers decreased significantly (by 29 percent) despite the fact that the number of births for the total population of Russia saw no dramatic change. 56 Previously, from 1995 to 1998, the registered number of births to Jewish mothers had decreased more moderately (by 19 percent) over the entire period. Thus, the significant reduction in 1999 can probably be attributed to the new form of birth certificate. Interestingly, among the recorded births to Jewish mothers in 1999, the share born with Jewish fathers remained stable (26 percent). We may conclude that, in Russia today, many individuals who were once "officially recognized" Jews (those listed as Jews in Soviet passports) prefer not to declare their Jewish ethnicity, regardless of whether they are married to Jews or non-Jews. The preceding year, Rosstat had ceased the processing of data on migration by ethnicity. 58 Fortunately, however, enough data had previously been collected to allow for the investigation of an important phenomenon in the contemporary numerical dynamics of world Jewry-the massive shift in ethnic/religious status of immigrants from the FSU upon their arrival in Israel.
In the Russian Federation, the internal passport was revised in 1997. As noted, the new passports did not contain a listing for ethnicity. When these new passports were introduced, the Goskomstat of Russia (as the statistical agency was then called) recommended that ethnicity be specified in personal forms of the statistical registration of migration "as reported by the citizen himself (so slov)." 59 Children under 14 would not have their own passports, and in migration statistics their ethnicity would be determined, as previously, on the basis of that of their parents. If the father and mother belonged to different ethnic groups, "one registers the ethnic identity [of the child] as that of one of the parents, preference being given to the mother's ethnicity." 60 Israeli statistics are based on the Ministry of Interior population register file, which defines "who is a Jew" in accordance with Jewish religious law (halakhah): either a person born to a Jewish mother (female lineage is decisive and the number of generations backwards is not determined) or one who has converted to Judaism. As in the Israeli Law of Return, only conversion to another religion can abrogate Jewish lineage. Logically, in the official Israeli data, the share of Jews among all immigrants from the FSU countries is much higher than what appears in FSU migration statistics, as is seen, for example, in the data regarding people who arrived from the Russian Federation (Table 8 .1).
Obviously, the converse can also be true. Some of the immigrants who were considered Jews according to their former Soviet internal passports (as well as in population censuses)-that is, the offspring of a Jewish male and non-Jewish female-fall under the category of non-Jews in Israeli statistical data. However, the opposite situation is in fact more prevalent: there are many more immigrants who are counted as Jews in Israel than were registered as such in the FSU. These individuals, who had previously neither identified themselves nor had been regarded by FSU authorities as Jews, represent a significant recent addition to the core Jewish population in Israel and to world Jewry as a whole.
Lack of understanding with regard to provisions of the Israeli Law of Return has led to claims such as that, in 2006, "three-quarters of emigrants to Israel [from Russia] were [ethnic] Russians." 61 According to the Israeli data for that year, the share of Jews among immigrants from Russia was 46 percent-whereas in the comparable Rosstat count, it was only 20 percent. Moreover, according to the Israeli data, when only non-Jewish spouses and children of Jews are included in the reckoning in addition to Jews (that is, leaving out more distant relatives such as spouses of nonJewish children, and non-Jewish grandchildren and their spouses), the figure rises to more than 70 percent of all immigrants from the FSU in 2006.
It is difficult to obtain current, detailed vital statistics for Jews (and other ethnic groups) in the post-Soviet countries: such studies that exist cover only small groups. The practice does continue in Latvia and Moldova. However, in general, the old tradition of collecting data on vital events by ethnicity, on which many demographic studies of the Jews in the FSU were based, has all but ended.
Post-Soviet Censuses and the Jews
Between 1995 and 2004, the first post-Soviet censuses were conducted in all the newly independent states, except Uzbekistan. A question on ethnicity, which counted Jews among many other ethnic groups, was included in each of these censuses. The gap of some 20,000 people between my estimate and that of the official census demonstrates the accelerated process of Jewish assimilation in contemporary Russia. As noted, since the introduction of the new internal passport in 1997, a significant portion of Jews in the Russian Federation have opted not to be recorded as Jewish. 63 This fits in with the findings regarding birth statistics, whereby many former "officially recognized" Jews prefer not to declare their ethnicity even when they are not part of a mixed marriage.
My correction is almost three times higher than that of Nikita Mkrtchian in the framework of general corrections by ethnicity in the results of the 2002 Russian census. He based his adjustment for Jews on 0.5 percent of the total number of people whose ethnicity was not recorded in this census (as noted above, these numbered about 1.5 million). 64 At the same time, my correction is much more conservative than that of Aleksandr Sinelnikov. 65 Like Yoel Florsheim and Dorith Tal in the above-noted paper devoted to the Soviet Jewish population as a whole, Sinelnikov based the necessity of his correction on the peculiarities of the recorded Jewish agesex structure in the Russian Federation. According to the 1989 Soviet census, the number Jewish men in the Russian Federation was greater than that of Jewish women in all ages up to 60. In part, this dearth of Jewish women in Russia stems from the earlier migration to this republic of predominantly male Jews from Ukraine. 66 According to the 2002 Russian census, this shortage extended to all ages up to 70.
There must be a reason for this development. It cannot be explained by the difference in mortality rates between sexes, as male mortality rates are always higher than those of females in modern developed countries. A more plausible explanation is that in this period of mass emigration, Jewish females, as noted, were more prone to leave the country than were Jewish males. 67 Alternative interpretations such as higher rates of ethnic assimilation of Jewish women in mixed marriages and/or higher rates of ethnic reaffiliation with the Jewish people for men of mixed parentage seem less relevant, especially for the older age groups, in which the Jewish sex imbalance grew as well.
Sinelnikov, however, assumed that many Jewish women in the census count were simply "missed," that is, they were recorded as being of another ethnicity when census takers filled in census forms in their absence. He used the age-sex structure of the Israeli Jewish population in his correction. Yet the Israeli Jewish population, as rightly noted by Florsheim and Tal, is unusual in the extent to which it is affected by migration. 68 Sinelikov also relied on an arbitrary supposition that, in the 2002 Russian census count, half as many Jewish men as Jewish women were "missed." All in all, he inflated the census figure for Jews in the Russian Federation by 23 percent. 69 The census results of two Baltic countries, Latvia and Estonia, were exceptional with regard to their findings on the Jews, as they showed a net increase in the Jewish population. In Latvia, the number of Jews recorded in the first post-Soviet census of 2000 (10,385) is substantially higher than the estimate based on the 1989 Soviet census and subsequent vital and migration balances by the local statistical agency (7, 976) . 70 It is known, however, that ethnicity in the 2000 Latvian census was drawn from the national population register rather than being based on answers to a census question. 71 In the first 10 years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, only 12 Jews officially changed their identities to Latvian, whereas many more-122 Latvians-changed their identities to Jewish in the population register. 72 Moreover, Latvian Jews are mostly Russophones, and we may surmise that the number of persons of mixed Jewish-Russian origin who officially changed their identities from Russian to Jewish-for which there is no known information-was much greater: this may have produced most of the jump in the Latvian census results for the number of Jews. A corresponding shift for Estonia was also found. 73 Currently, the population registers of the three Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have become a source of annually updated information on the number of Jews.
Since 2009, a new round of censuses has begun in the FSU countries, and there is once again a question on ethnicity in each of these censuses. Uzbekistan is not planning a census count; for this country, the last census data are those from the 1989 Soviet census.
The 77 Yet of those recorded as Jews by religion, fully 37 percent were recorded by ethnicity as Kazakhs, and 27 percent as Russian. Another inexplicable finding concerned the age of Jews by religion: less than 11 percent were aged 65 and above. From all this, it is clear that the number of Jews by religion in this census was seriously overstated and that some people, in the main traditionally Muslim Kazakhs, were mistakenly counted as adherents to the Jewish religion.
The most comprehensive data for religious affiliation with regard to Jews were recorded in the results of the 2000 Estonian census. 78 This is the first census for which enough statistical data is available concerning apostasy. According to the 2000 Estonian census data, only 19.8 percent of Jews aged 15 and older (whose numbers totaled 1,989) were recorded as "followers of a particular faith"; of these, 11 percent stated Judaism as their religion, whereas more than 7.5 percent declared themselves to be followers of one of the branches of Christianity. More specifically, more than two-thirds of those professing Christianity belonged to the Orthodox [Christian] church (pravoslavnye). This is noteworthy, given that most Estonian Christians are Lutherans. One possible explanation for this anomaly is that, according to the census, more than 80 percent of Estonian Jews spoke Russian as their mother tongue. The closeness to Russian culture may explain the appeal of Russian Orthodoxy to those opting out of Judaism. According to the 2000 Estonian census, only 38 non-Jews by ethnicity declared Judaism to be their religion, whereas 151 ethnic Jews were recorded as belonging to different branches of Christianity. Thus, the balance is clearly negative for Judaism. To be sure, none of the above-cited data can be utilized for any corrections of the core Jewish population, since approximately one-third of the Jews and one-sixth of the non-Jews either refused to answer the question regarding religious affiliation or (for technical reasons) their religious affiliation could not be determined. At the same time, data from the 2000 Estonian census clearly demonstrate erosion of the core Jewish population through apostasy. 79 In post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, a sampling of the Jewish population found that "over 10 percent see Christianity as most attractive." 80 Moreover, according to Elena Nosenko-Stein, many of the Jews attracted to Christianity-in particular, baptized Jews in Russia-identified themselves as being "Russian Orthodox Christian Jewish." 81 Another significant finding emerged in a study undertaken in St. Petersburg, which showed that all of the Jews (with two Jewish parents) who had converted to Christianity continued to identify themselves ethnically as Jews. 82 Given that our estimates of the core Jewish population (which, according to general definition, excludes persons of Jewish parentage who adopt another religion) are based on census data, FSU numbers with regard to core Jews are obviously somewhat overstated.
The 2002 Russian census data provided a new opportunity to update estimates of the enlarged Jewish population. 83 There is no analogous estimate based on the post-Soviet census published for any other FSU country. However, Mark Kupovetsky undertook the ambitious project of evaluating "the potential of Jewish emigration" based on an even broader definition than that defined by the Israeli Law of Return (which comprises Jews, their children and grandchildren, and all their respective spouses). Kupovetsky's category included Jews who had converted to another religion, who would be ineligible to immigrate to Israel under the provisions of the Law of Return. He produced the figures based on this definition for each FSU country for 1989 and 2003. 84 However, given the lack of much appropriate data for his computations, Kupovetsky inevitably made use of guesstimates. In addition, he did not outline the stages of his computations, which makes it difficult to judge their validity. At the same time, it is clear that the attempt to estimate the size and structure of broader categories of the Jewish population should be continued.
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Conclusion
In the face of ample data pointing to a demographic collapse of Jewish population in the countries comprising the former Soviet Union, wishful thinking persists. With regard to the Russian Federation, for instance, highly inflated figures purporting to be the "real" number of Jews-ranging from 1,000,000-2,000,000 to the more fantastical figure of 10 million 85 -continue to circulate online and in the popular press, even as the number of pupils in Jewish schools and the roster of those receiving aid from Jewish charities continue to decline. 86 The problem is exacerbated when erroneous figures find their way into scholarly publications. Thus, for example, a 2002 Russian census figure of 259,000 has been presented for the total Jewish population of Russia, and it has been reported that the two largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, have a Jewish population of, respectively, 148,000 and 55,200. . 88 The official census figures show that Moscow and St. Petersburg account for about half the total Russian Jewish population, whereas the erroneous figures show that 78 percent of Russian Jews live in these two cities. In terms of Jewish communal funding, a reliance on inaccurate data may lead to serious underfunding of provincial Jewish communities outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg.
The post-Soviet shift in data collection, in particular, the elimination of the categories of vital and migration statistics by ethnicity, has dealt a blow to Jewish demography. An especially serious consequence is the inability to obtain new information on Jewish mortality. At the same time, post-Soviet censuses have continued to collect data by ethnicity, and these provide scholars with much important information regarding Jewish age-sex structure, fertility, and nuptuality, including mixed marriage. In addition, migration statistics of receiving countries, especially those of Israel, remain of real importance. There is also a good deal of previously collected data; alongside new information, such data provide a solid basis for the continuing demographic study of Jews in the post-Soviet countries.
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